denying the antecedent
13/08/2012.
Case Background
The case at hand is about interpreting what existing case law states about when the Charter right to counsel under section 10(b) should or should not be granted, and specifically what constitutes sufficient counsel.
While Sinclair was being questioned as a suspect in the death of a friend, he stated repeatedly that he wished to obtain counsel further to the six minutes of counsel he had previously received at the point of detention, pursuant to his s. 10(b) right. The questioning police officer told him several times that while Sinclair had the right to remain silent he did not have the right to seek further counsel, denied him of that further counsel and continued to persuade him to answer the questions. Eventually, Sinclair admitted to killing his friend in perceived self-defence, first during questioning and then later to an undercover police officer in the holding cell, and even brought the police to the scene of the crime to engage in a re-enactment of it.[1]
The
trial judge admitted all of this evidence on the common law grounds that it was
obtained by Sinclair through voluntary admission, sentencing him to
manslaughter.[2]
The case was appealed under the argument that Sinclair's s. 10(b) right to
counsel was not respected.[3]
The court of appeal rejected all of the various arguments presented, upheld the
initial ruling that no charter breach had occurred and dismissed the appeal.[4]
The case was again appealed. The Supreme Court again ruled that this final
appeal should be dismissed due to the absence of a charter breach[5],
coming to two distinct conclusions regarding detainee rights under section 10
(b). First, a detainee's right to obtain counsel under s. 10(b) does not extend
to the right to have counsel present during a police interrogation. Second, a
detainee only has the right to have additional contact with counsel after there
has been a change of circumstances that include (but are not limited to) three
specific types of changes[6]:
new procedures involving the detainee,
a change in jeopardy and a reason to question the detainee’s understanding of
his (her) section 10(b) right.
Jurisprudential History
While the case in question is based on multiple existing precedents, it is also a novel ruling in the sense that it attempts to combine multiple existing precedents into a singular test for section 10(b) rights. Understanding the history of the ruling consequently means understanding the various components of the new test rather than any previously existing rulings. It should also be noted right away that the majority applies an objective logical fallacy at the root of its reasoning and that the legal history of the ideas underlying case is consequently of questionable relevance in the court's final decision.
The
Majority cites R v. Evans [1991] in
stating that the police only have a
duty to allow further counsel when circumstances change.[7]
Taking a closer look at that case, which is one where a conviction was
overturned due to infringement of s. 10(b) rights, reveals a rather different
situation: [8]
The
jurisprudence establishes that the duty on the police to inform a detained
person of his or her right to counsel encompasses three subsidiary duties: (1)
the duty to inform the detainee of his right to counsel; (2) the duty to give
the detainee who so wishes a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right to
retain and instruct counsel without delay; and (3) the duty to refrain from
eliciting evidence from the detainee until the detainee has had a reasonable
opportunity to retain and instruct counsel: R. v. Manninen,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233; R. v. Ross, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Black, supra.
In Black, the rider was added that the accused must be reasonably
diligent in attempting to obtain counsel
if he wishes to do so, otherwise the correlative duty
on the police to refrain from questioning him is suspended.
From R.
v. Manninen [1987], where conviction was also
overturned:[9]
In my view, s. 10(b) imposes at least two duties on the police
in addition to the duty to inform the detainee of his rights. First, the police
must provide the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right
to retain and instruct counsel without delay. The detainee is in the control of
the police and he cannot exercise his right to counsel unless the police
provide him with a reasonable opportunity to do so. This aspect of the right to
counsel was recognized in Canadian law well before the advent of the Charter.
In Brownridge v.
The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 926, a case decided under the Canadian Bill of
Rights, Laskin J., as he then was, wrote at pp.
952‑53:
The right to retain and instruct counsel without delay can only have
meaning to an arrested or detained person if it is taken as raising a
correlative obligation upon the police authorities to facilitate contact with
counsel. This means allowing him upon his request to use the telephone for that
purpose if one is available.
Also from R. v. Manninen: [10]
Further, s. 10(b) imposes on the police the duty to cease
questioning or otherwise attempting to elicit evidence from the detainee until
he has had a reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct counsel. The purpose
of the right to counsel is to allow the detainee not only to be informed of his
rights and obligations under the law but, equally if not more important, to obtain
advice as to how to exercise those rights. In this case, the police officers
correctly informed the respondent of his right to remain silent and the main
function of counsel would be to confirm the existence of that right and then to
advise him as to how to exercise it
….as well as….[11]
The Ontario Court of Appeal came
to the same conclusion in
If the suspect states
that he wishes to retain counsel all questioning must cease until he has been
afforded the opportunity of consulting counsel....
R. v. Black [1989] is further cited in R. v. Evans: [12]
This
Court's judgment in R. v. Black, supra, per Wilson J., makes it clear
that there is a duty on the police to advise the accused of his or her right to
counsel a second time when new circumstances arise indicating that the accused
is a suspect for a different, more serious crime than was the case at the time
of the first warning.
Directly from R. v. Black[13]:
The accused did not exhaust her
rights to counsel when she briefly spoke with her lawyer in relation to the
initial charge. The rights accruing to a person under s. 10(b) of the Charter arise because that person has been
arrested or detained for a particular reason. An individual, therefore,
can only exercise his s. 10(b) rights in a
meaningful way if he knows the extent of his jeopardy. When the accused
contacted her lawyer, she was under arrest for attempted murder. This is
significantly different from a charge of first degree murder. Given the
difference in the charges, to conclude that the advice from her counsel would
inevitably have been the same is sheer conjecture. It is improper for a
court to speculate about the type of legal advice which would have been given
had the accused actually succeeded in contacting counsel after the charge was
changed.
The following caveat also appears at the end of R. v. Evans:[14]
We do not, of course, lay down rules that determine facts and I am not persuaded that this is a case in which we should attempt to formulate rules that will indelibly characterize some changes in the purpose of an investigation as imposing specific new duties, the breach of which are Charter violations.
A further substantive issue was discussed, namely the purpose of section 10(b) within the Charter. The court cites itself[15] in R. v. Hebert [1990]:[16]
The
guarantee of the right to consult counsel confirms that the essence of the
right is the accused’s freedom to choose whether to
make a statement or not. The state is not obliged to protect the suspect
against making a statement; indeed it is open to the state to use legitimate
means of persuasion to encourage the suspect to do so. The state is, however, obliged
to allow the suspect to make an informed choice about whether or not he will
speak to the authorities. To assist in that choice, the suspect is given the
right to counsel.
The decision
upheld three specific situations that the court considered to be valid in
determining whether or not the circumstances of the case had changed or not,
while allowing for further examples in the future. While these three specific
situations are really examples rather than categories, and it may not be
necessary to explicitly explore them in future decisions citing this one as
precedent, they are cited within the decision and will be noted here. First is the question of whether or not there
is a "new procedure". This is meant to allow the detainee to consult
counsel before the police use a method of analysis or interrogation that may
not have been predicted by counsel and may require further consultation, such
as a lie detector test or a line-up.[17]
The case where this was upheld as a reason for further counsel was R. v. Ross [1989]. The second example of
an accepted change leading to the right to seek further counsel is a change in
jeopardy relating to a modification of the charges[18],
as was the case in R. v. Evans and R. v. Black. This is considered to be
consistent with the Charter rights
under s. 10(b) because a change of charges is in effect a new condition for
detainment and retriggers both s. 10(a) and s. 10(b). The third example
provided is the situation where there are reasons to believe that the detainee
does not fully understand their rights under s. 10(b), either as a result of
having waived them or as a result of a police officer's perception of the
detainee's understanding.[19]
The cases cited are R. v. Prosper [1994] and R.
v. Burlingham [1995].
A secondary issue in the case was whether a detainee's right to obtain counsel under s. 10(b) should extend to the right to have counsel present during a police interrogation. While an existing body of law exists on the topic at a provincial level, this is an issue that had not previously been contemplated by the Supreme Court of Canada; it follows that no relevant case law exists at the Supreme Court level. In this case, that doesn't matter as upholding such a right would be inconsistent with the majority's decision regarding rights to seek further counsel.
Analysis
While the cases that the court has brought to attention may convincingly uphold the claim that a change in circumstances necessitates a further right to counsel, nowhere do they exclude other reasons or suggest any basis for the following claim by the majority[20]:
The
surrounding text of s. 10 does not greatly assist in resolving the debate on
whether s. 10(b) confers initial or continuing rights. Section 10(a)
provides the right on arrest or detention “to be informed promptly of the
reasons therefor”. This clearly confers a duty to
give the detainee information at a discrete point in time; there is no requirement that the police convey this information more
than once, unless the reasons themselves change: R. v. Evans, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869.
In fact, the cited caveat in R. v. Evans seems to be a request that
the case not be used in further jurisprudence due to its unusual nature.
The
argument presented by the majority is as follows:
If there is a change in circumstance, there
is a right to counsel. (R v. Evans)
There is no change in
circumstance in R. v. Sinclair.
Therefore, there is no
right to counsel in R. v. Sinclair.
This argument is an example of a logical fallacy called denying the antecedent.[21]
Now, it may very well be true that some other precedent exists for the claim that a lack of change in circumstance implies no further right to counsel. However, as it exists in R. v. Sinclair, this claim is presented only by means of logical fallacy. Furthermore, in its discussion of the various other reasons for a second counsel that are presented by the dissenting judges, the majority merely authoritatively upholds the fallacy without any argument at all:
It is assumed
that the initial legal advice received was sufficient and correct in relation
to how the detainee should exercise his
or her rights in the context of the police investigation. The failure to
provide an additional opportunity to consult counsel will constitute a breach
of s. 10(b) only when it becomes clear, as a result of changed
circumstances or new developments, that the initial advice, viewed
contextually, is no longer sufficient or correct.
While respect for the Chief Justice
should be upheld, logic is also authoritarian in nature; as any deduction by
means of logical fallacy is invalid by definition, it follows that the court's
reasoning on this point is objectively wrong, no matter how often or how
strenuously it is stated. The dictatorial approach the majority takes in this
case, accompanied by an almost total lack of valid argumentation, is
disappointing, to say the least, and primarily because it does not allow for
argumentative dissent. Little else can
be said of the ruling.
However, there is currently no body of logicians regulating decisions made by the Supreme Court of Canada and its reasoning, however faulty, consequently stands. Yet, it cannot be reasonably traced to or deduced from existing case law and consequently must be viewed as a novel decision made by an activist court acting outside of the boundaries of existing case law.
Whatever one may think of it,
applying this test to the facts in the case does deny the appeal. First, at no
point in the interrogation did the police apply or attempt to apply a novel
procedure. Second, there was no change in the charges during the period of
detention. Demonstrating the third type of change in circumstances would
require demonstrating that Sinclair at some point did not fully understand his
rights; by quoting some of his various statements directly, as well as the
views of those involved at various stages in the case, it was shown that this
is not upheld. It was posited, correctly or incorrectly, that there were no
further changes in the case. Yet, it needs to be stressed that these are
examples rather than categories and that demonstrating each point was really
not necessary.[22]
It is useful at this point to
interject the fact that the thesis that it can be comprehensively shown that
all types of change were not present is unsustainable. Should this approach be
followed, the inevitable result is an ever increasing list of examples to check
against. Rather, the burden should lay with the defendant to appeal on grounds
of a specific change in circumstances and the court to grant or deny the
appeal.
The court addressed two further concerns outside of the fallaciously applied precedent. One was the question of whether a detainee's right to obtain counsel under s. 10(b) should extend to the right to have counsel present during a police interrogation. It is not necessary to cite any case law to deduce that this right must be denied as a result of the previous "deduction", as flawed as it might be. This can be shown formally through a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that the right to ever-present counsel exists. Then there would necessarily be a right to consult counsel without there being a change in the circumstances of the case. Yet, this contradicts the previous result.
Putting the majority's logically catastrophic ruling aside, the question of what it is that existing case law actually says in the matter remains an open one. The existing precedent prior to this case does not uphold the view that the sole reason for further counsel is due to a change in circumstances, it merely provides it as one possible reason to allow further counsel. In fact, the very case law that the majority cited firmly upholds the right to counsel and the duty of the police to refrain from questioning until then. R v. Evans, amongst others, is quite clear:[23]
(2) the duty to give the detainee who so wishes a
reasonable opportunity to exercise the right to retain and instruct counsel
without delay; and (3) the duty to refrain from eliciting evidence from the
detainee until the detainee has had a reasonable opportunity to retain and
instruct counsel
Is two brief three
minute encounters and an answering machine meaningful counsel? Is it reasonable to deny "further"
counsel? At least one judge did not think so.[24]
If the purpose of the section 10(b) right is to "allow the detainee not only to be informed of his rights and
obligations under the law but, equally if not more important, to obtain advice
as to how to exercise those rights."[25], then
it seems clear that the more valid question in this case is whether that right
has been satisfied in the first place, not whether the circumstances have
changed to allow "further" counsel. Now, who makes the decision? It
seems unreasonable to think anybody other than the detainee should make
decisions about whether s/he requires further counsel or not!
Dissenting for only
himself, Justice Binnie produces the most reasonable
position in stating that further counsel should be reasonably allowed on request as a result of evolving circumstances.[26] This
approach would allow the detainee to retain almost full autonomy in choosing
when to seek counsel, in accordance with the presumption of innocence.
In rejecting the right
of ever-present counsel as too extreme and beneficial only to the wealthy,
Justice Binnnie produces words of wisdom regarding
the application of a standard of reasonableness[27]:
There
exists an intermediate position that would allow the detainee reasonable access
to legal advice from time to time in the course of a police interrogation
(which in this case, as stated, lasted about five hours) without defence counsel being actually present in the interrogation
room. The Crown argues that any such approach would create difficult issues of
line drawing for police interrogators: When should further consultation be
allowed? When can it be delayed? How frequently is “reasonable”? The
fact is, however, that unless the detainee is to have a constitutional
right unilaterally to stop police questioning at any time merely by
indicating a wish to speak to counsel (again) — a position which in my view tilts
the balance too far against the community interest in law enforcement — it is
inevitable that the police are going to have to make the reasonableness
judgment in the first instance. I do not see this as deeply problematic.
Police deal with “reasonableness” issues all the time. It is one of the
organizing principles that govern their professional work. Various factors can
provide guidance, as will be discussed. What is not acceptable, in my view,
is to read down the s. 10(b) right for the purpose of making it
easier for the police to administer it.
Justice Binnie also provides some examples of what he considers to be reasonable circumstances[28], but they need not be analyzed here. It is enough to cite the standard of what a reasonable person would consider should allow a request for further counsel. The majority's characteristically authoritarian response ejected this suggestion as 'vague',[29] while failing to understand that its vagueness is what makes its consistent with a liberal application of the Charter. Unfortunately, by falling for the distraction, Justice Binnie does not help his own case as well as he could have. He does, however, convincingly explain that 'reasonableness' is a widely applied standard in law and that applying it here is far from absurd.[30]
Some commentators have suggested that the decision arrived at in the case restricts the right to the presumption of innocence.[31]It is unclear how that may be the case. Nor can the Charter be reasonably interpreted to uphold a general right against self-incrimination outside of the court room; suggestions that it might are rather preposterous.[32]
Conclusion
It is somewhat disconcerting to note that such an important decision is based on such faulty reasoning. Due to this faulty reasoning, it's hard to imagine that the test will stand long. While it stands, it represents an unfortunately conservative interpretation of the Charter that seems slanted towards the increasing police state. Specifically, the decision seems to be interested in restricting rights rather than increasing them, a disappointing attitude that is fundamentally incompatible with liberty. Given that rights to counsel are hardly a populist issue designed to quell dissent and are, if anything, a protection against the very tyranny of populism itself, it is unclear why the section would have been erected should it not have been meant to apply in its most liberal interpretation. By taking a rights-restricting approach, the majority seems to have fully missed the point. It seems very doubtful that Trudeau, Chretien and the rest of them should have wished to see this right to counsel restricted to a meaningless linguistic game amongst judges while real people see their rights restricted. The draconian requirement of a "change in circumstances" is simply too narrow to uphold the purpose of s. 10(b) effectively.
While Justice Binnie is most correct, he errs in his deduction that a new trial should follow. Regardless of whether Sinclair's right to counsel was respected, it is quite clear that Sinclair is guilty of manslaughter, and beyond any reasonable doubt. So, allowing this evidence does not bring the administration of justice in disrepute. To the contrary: it is ordering a retrial that would.
The concern here to justice is consequently not with the outcome of this specific case, which is reasonable, but of the draconian and fallaciously constructed precedent it sets for further cases.
Bibliography
LEGISLATION
Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule
B to the
<http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/charter/page-1.html>
JURISPRUDENCE
R. v. Black, 1989 2 SCR 138, online: Judgments of The Supreme Court of Canada,
< http://scc.lexum.org/en/1989/1989scr2-138/1989scr2-138.html>
R. v. Burlingham, 1995 2 SCR 206, online: Judgments of The Supreme Court of Canada,
< http://scc.lexum.org/en/1995/1995scr2-206/1995scr2-206.html>
R. v. Evans, 1991 1 SCR 869, online: Judgments of The Supreme Court of Canada,
< http://scc.lexum.org/en/1991/1991scr1-869/1991scr1-869.html>
R. v. Hebert, 1990 2 SCR 151, online: Judgments of The Supreme Court of Canada,
< http://scc.lexum.org/en/1990/1990scr2-151/1990scr2-151.html>
R. v. Manninen, 1987 1 SCR 1233, online: Judgments of The Supreme Court of Canada,
< http://scc.lexum.org/en/1987/1987scr1-1233/1987scr1-1233.html>
R. v. Prosper, 1994 3 SCR 236, online: Judgments of The Supreme Court of Canada,
< http://scc.lexum.org/en/1994/1994scr3-236/1994scr3-236.html>
R. v. Ross, 1989 1 SCR 3, online: Judgments of The Supreme Court of Canada,
< http://scc.lexum.org/en/1989/1989scr1-3/1989scr1-3.html>
R. v.
Sinclair, 2008 BCCA 127, online: The Courts of
British Columbia, <http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/Jdb-txt/CA/08/01/2008BCCA0127.htm>
R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, online: Judgments of The Supreme Court of Canada,
<
http://scc.lexum.org/en/2010/2010scc35/2010scc35.html>
SECONDARY MATERIALS: WEBSITES
Denying the Antecedent, online: Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denying_the_antecedent>
Legal Citation, online: Queen's University Library, <http://library.queensu.ca/law/lederman/legalcitation>
Part
1: Case Comment Format, online:
<http://law.wustl.edu/publications/pages.aspx?id=840>
Your Quick Guide to Citing Legal Sources based
on Canadian Guide to Uniform Legal Citation McGill Law Journal, 7th Edition (2010), Durham College School of Justice and Emergency
Services,
<http://www.durhamcollege.ca/wp-content/uploads/Legal-Citation-for-Legal- Administration.pdf>
Note: the McGill handbook suggested citing
online cases in the following manner:
This is quite obtuse and rather nonsensical. It would require the reader to go to the root of the domain and then search for a docket number (in this case, 71-006). Such a search engine might not even exist! Why not just cite the full hyperlink, as I've done? The only rational reason underlying such an obtuse standard is to act as a means of dissuading the internet standard. This is disappointing; this kind of regressive Luddism is currently a powerful force of thought within academia but needs to be resisted with increasing aggression lest abstract thought become a casualty of technology (surely, the academics do not think they can defeat technology?) and the McGill standard consequently ought to be rejected in favour of something more palatable.
As it turns out, the McGill text provides a perfectly reasonable replacement in its general treatment of online sources, which I've adapted for case law. I would suggest that this be standardized.
[1] R. v. Sinclair, 2008 BCCA 127, para 6-25 (available on LexUM)
[2] R. v. Sinclair, 2008 BCCA
127, para 27-32 (available on LexUM)
[3] R. v. Sinclair, 2008 BCCA
127, para 4 (available on LexUM)
[4] R. v. Sinclair, 2008 BCCA
127, para 70 (available on LexUM)
[5] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, para 3 (available on LexUM)
[6] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 2 (available on LexUM)
[7] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 22 (available on LexUM)
[8] R. v. Evans, 1991 1 SCR
869 (available on LexUM)
[9] R. v. Manninen,
1987 1 SCR 1233, para 21 (available on LexUM)
[10] R. v. Manninen,
1987 1 SCR 1233, para 23 (available on LexUM)
[11] R. v. Manninen,
1987 1 SCR 1233, para 23 (available on LexUM)
[12] R. v. Evans, 1991 1 SCR
869 (available on LexUM)
[13] R. v. Black, 1989 2 SCR
138, para (available on LexUM)
[14] R. v. Evans, 1991 1 SCR
869 (available on LexUM)
[15] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 25 (available on LexUM)
[16] R.
v. Hebert, 1990 2 SCR 151 (available on LexUM)
[17] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 50 (available on LexUM)
[18] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 51 (available on LexUM)
[19] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 52 (available on LexUM)
[20] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 22 (available on LexUM)
[21] Denying the Antecedent, online: Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denying_the_antecedent>
[22] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 66-75 (available on LexUM)
[23] R. v. Evans, 1991 1 SCR
869 (available on LexUM)
[24] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 83 (available on LexUM)
[25] R. v. Manninen,
1987 1 SCR 1233, para 23 (available on LexUM)
[26] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 80 (available on LexUM)
[27] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 105 (available on LexUM)
[28] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 106 (available on LexUM)
[29] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 59 (available on LexUM)
[30] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 108 (available on LexUM)
[31] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 125 (available on LexUM)
[32] R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC
35, para 63 (available on LexUM)