1. What are the justifications for private property? What are the critiques?

One of the presented justifications for private property is the idea that market theory has created great wealth in western societies and the reasons for the generation of this great wealth lie in upholding property rights. The text responds by pointing out that the authoritarian regimes that dominated the "communist" world were closer to a kind of feudalism than a kind of socialism, that behavioural economics has successfully debunked many of the assumptions of market theory and that we ought not to be driven solely by the desire to maximize productivity because that might blind us to greater moral questions, such as inequality. However, I feel it is more prudent to actually question the premise. Western economies are, in fact, characterized by their absurd levels of inequality. A look around me would observe great wealth and abundance concentrated in the hands of a few while the masses struggle to survive amidst great distributive inefficiency and resource squandering, and I would assign property rights as the cause of that suffering. Of what value is efficiency in production if it creates inefficiency in distribution? This is self-defeating! Further, this great wealth we observe is not the result of exchange over free markets at all but of coercion, theft and violent exploitation. These violent methods of resource domination are premised solely upon the idea of ownership.

Nonetheless, the critique from behavioural economics is substantial. If human beings are not inherently rational and make decisions based on a completely different set of criteria then the assumptions of market economics clearly need to be fully reconsidered, and this applies equally as well to Marxist economics as it does to classical economics. However, this ought not to be the extent of the criticism against classical economics. Classical economics is full of causal assertions that follow not from empirical studies but from stated assumptions; it is a type of analytic philosophy, not a type of empirical science. Yet, it must become an empirical science if it is to be expected to make useful predictions. Without that conversion, what market theory could only ever present to us is a utopian vision of an ideal society, where complex, observable phenomena follow over-simplified, linear mathematical equations; market economies do not exist in real life, but only as ideal abstractions. The imperfect realization of theoretical markets is most powerfully demonstrated by the ubiquity of corruption within capitalism, which is something that Keynesians have corrected classical theory for, and is something that any discussion of market theory, however cursory, should never overlook. The idea of competition, itself, while central to market theory, is often less desirable for producers than collusion is, leading unregulated markets to collapse in on themselves in favour of effective monopolies. It follows that a society built on free markets and unregulated private property rights could only ever lead to exploitative corporatism and immense levels of inequality. This is, however, not truly an argument for the abolition of property rights but an explanation that property rights must at least be regulated and restricted.

A second argument put forth in favour of private property comes from utilitarianism. It argues that as wealth maximization is attached to happiness, and property is a type of wealth, private property should be protected in order to maximize happiness. However, the text points out that this is not a very stable application of utilitarianist ideas, as it could be argued equally convincingly (and arguably much more convincingly) that wealth redistribution would maximize happiness for the highest number of people. Bentham's response was that the abolition of private property would have a negative effect on industry. Whether correct or not, that seems to be an admission that his approach is incomplete and that things other than maximizing happiness are also important. What Bentham really seems to be upholding in his response is the idea that class hierarchy is more fundamental than the maximization of happiness, and, in that, he is really breaking with his own theory; Bentham's response about industry should really not be considered relevant in the context of what utilitarianism actually says about private property. Ziff attempts to sneak out of this by stating that utilitarianism is not a convincing argument in favour of private property; indeed, it's a rather convincing argument against it, in principle, especially in a society with stark pre-existing disparities in wealth. Under such pre-existing conditions, any argument in favour of private property is necessarily converted into an argument for wealth redistribution and for precisely the reasons articulated for private property; property is freedom, property is theft.

A third argument is the idea that private property increases privacy, but this is really just an assumption (there is no reason we can't have privacy without private property) and is not substantial enough to seriously contemplate. Likewise, the argument for property in terms of power is head-scratching. Power means conflict. So, who wants to argue for a system in terms of power? I'd be more likely to suggest that private property is best abolished because it creates conflict through power struggles. Yet, the text brings up an interesting example with homeless people. Might they be homeless in the first place because of the ability to charge rent through private property? Might the abolition of rent not be a better solution than creating more and more competition and conflict?

The arguments about personhood and self-identity are most convincing, but they cannot be discussed coherently in an environment where there is no separation of private and personal property.

LAWS 2201,

Mar 2013